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Talking Points for the ADDI

9 June 1986

Qadhafi's Position After the Airstrike

Regime Vulnerabilities

Domestic reactions to the US airstrike last April confirm Qadhafi's unprecedented political problems.

- Press reports indicate that the funeral procession in Tripoli for those killed in the attack attracted only several thousand marchers out of a local population of about 900,000.

[REDACTED]

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- [REDACTED] popular criticism of Qadhafi has become more open since the US strike.

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- [REDACTED] anti-Qadhafi graffiti recently appeared in Tripoli and Banghazi for the first time this year. [REDACTED]

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Washington's humiliation of the Libyan military--Libyan forces proved unable to defend Qadhafi even at his best protected residence--strengthens the political climate in Libyan that was already conducive to plotting.

[REDACTED]

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Qadhafi's failure to attract significant foreign support for his anti-US posture adds to his domestic vulnerabilities.

- Recent expulsions of Libyans involved in terrorist activities by West European governments and limits on the official Libyan presence contradict Qadhafi's claims of widespread international support and US isolation, as

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[REDACTED]

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[redacted]  
well as his denials of terrorist involvement.

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- [redacted]
- In our view, Qadhafi's failure to convene an extraordinary Arab League Summit has further undermined Qadhafi's attempts to persuade Libyans of US blame for the confrontation. [redacted]

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#### Regime Countermeasures

Although the US airstrike has weakened Qadhafi's grip on power, his extensive security precautions and the continuing loyalty of his security services protect him from all but the best-organized and skillfully implemented plots.

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- [redacted]
- We have no indication that the US attack has weakened the morale of either the Jamahiriya Guard--his principal coup protection force--or other domestic security elements. [redacted]

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25X6 In addition, Qadhafi apparently has been given a [redacted] lift by a recent Soviet commitment to strengthen the Libyan military capabilities against potential US attacks.

- In our view, Qadhafi's renewed approaches to the Soviets--highlighted by Libyan number two man Jallud's visit to Moscow two weeks ago--probably are intended in part to help shore up his domestic position.
- The Libyan leader may regard increased Soviet military assistance as a prerequisite for undercutting dissent in the officer corps and rebuilding his international prestige.
- Qadhafi might also perceive a major arms purchase as a means to revive traditional West European concerns over closer ties between Tripoli and Moscow and undermine the current Allied effort to isolate the Libyan regime.

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